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Merleau-Ponty and the Foundations of Psychopathology 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty was a 20th-century French philosopher who worked at the intersection of 
phenomenology and existentialism. Phenomenology, founded by Edmund Husserl and further 
developed by his students, including Martin Heidegger, is the study of human experience and 
existence. Traditionally, it describes the essential structures of consciousness—i.e., those 
features that hold for any experiencing human subject—including selfhood, intersubjectivity, 
affectivity, and temporality. Existentialism, in contrast with phenomenology, is not a systematic 
research program. Its themes originate in the 19th-century work of Søren Kierkegaard and 
Friedrich Nietzsche, though “existentialism” was not used as a philosophical label until Gabriel 
Marcel applied it to the work of Jean-Paul Sartre in the 1940s (Fulton 1999, 12–13). Like 
phenomenology, existentialism is the study of the nature of human existence and with how we 
experience a meaningful world. But existentialists are primarily concerned with human processes 
of self-creation—such as how we become who we are, or transform our identity—rather than 
with the unchanging essence of human being. In this respect, existentialists typically study 
contingent, rather than necessary, features of human existence. 
 In integrating these two apparently opposing lines of thought, Merleau-Ponty belongs in 
the company of other French phenomenologists, including Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de 
Beauvoir, who were inspired by Heidegger’s application of phenomenology to the study of 
existential themes, such as death and authenticity. These philosophers continued 
phenomenology’s inquiry into the structures of experience, but turned their attention toward 
contingent and particular structures, rather than just necessary and universal ones. This 
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existential turn in phenomenology is perhaps best expressed by Sartre’s famous line: “existence 
precedes essence” (Sartre [1945] 2007, 20). According to Sartre, the central feature of human 
existence is that we are free to decide who we are—we are radically free. I might see myself as a 
waiter, a mechanic, or a professor but, in truth, I am none of these. I am, first and foremost, the 
power of freely willing myself to become who I wish to be. (In an interview, Beauvoir claimed 
that Sartre even believed seasickness was the product of weak will; with enough willpower, 
anyone could overcome his seasickness [Simons 1992, 30]). Merleau-Ponty, a friend and 
colleague of Sartre and Beauvoir, also made human contingency central to his philosophical 
project—for him existence also precedes essence. But Merleau-Ponty was more concerned with 
how our natural and cultural circumstances shape us, than with how we freely shape ourselves.i 
To this end, he was especially interested in psychopathological conditions, from psychoanalytic 
neuroses to neurological disorders. 
Merleau-Ponty’s studies of psychopathology are often read as nothing more than 
instrumental examples in his studies of perception, including in his major work, Phenomenology 
of Perception; by examining how some aspect of perceptual experience goes awry (for instance, 
in schizophrenic hallucinations), we can gain insight into aspects of normal perception that we 
might have otherwise overlooked. This interpretation is not without merit (Merleau-Ponty does 
employ psychopathological examples instrumentally), but it would be inaccurate to characterize 
his interest in psychopathology as merely instrumental. Merleau-Ponty was interested in the 
psychopathological forms of human experience and existence because he aimed to construct a 
phenomenological program that adequately accommodated these conditions.  
 There are, of course, many phenomenologists who devoted themselves to the study of 
psychopathological conditions. Karl Jaspers first established psychopathology as an 
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interdisciplinary program employing the tools of natural science alongside philosophical 
phenomenology. In General Psychopathology, he draws a distinction between “explanation” and 
“understanding,” arguing that scientists can explain the causes of disorder, but only 
phenomenologists can understand the experience of disorder (Jaspers [1913] 1997). Only 
through the integration of natural science and phenomenology can we give an adequate account 
of mental disorders. Numerous phenomenological psychopathologists followed this line of 
thinking, including Ludwig Binswanger, Medard Boss, Frantz Fanon, Kimura Bin, Eugene 
Minkowski, Erwin Straus, and Hubertus Tellenbach. They developed novel accounts of mental 
disorders, including schizophrenia, melancholia, and various neuroses. With such a rich tradition 
of phenomenological psychopathology, why should we devote ourselves to the study of Merleau-
Ponty’s approach?  
Merleau-Ponty’s approach is distinctive because he seriously engages with the 
philosophical foundations of his own work. Most other phenomenological psychopathologists 
either took phenomenology’s ability to illuminate psychopathological experience for granted, or 
they integrated phenomenological and empirical approaches without considering the 
philosophical implications of these integrations.ii This is why we must turn to Merleau-Ponty, 
who explicitly developed metaphysical and methodological foundations for phenomenological 
psychopathology.  
In this chapter, I outline some distinctive elements of Merleau-Ponty’s metaphysics and 
method, and show how his work can provide a foundation for contemporary phenomenological 
studies of mental disorder. In section 1, I argue that Merleau-Ponty developed a new metaphysics 
that accommodates psychopathology by challenging the traditional distinction between 
transcendental and empirical phenomenology. In section 2, I argue that Merleau-Ponty modified 
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the core of the phenomenological method—i.e., the reduction, or epoché—in order to critically 
engage with the human sciences. Each section is composed of three subsections: the first 
provides an account of Husserl’s phenomenology, and shows how it falls short of what we 
require for the study of psychopathology; the second describes Merleau-Ponty’s novel 
phenomenological approach; and the third provides examples of contemporary applications of 
Merleau-Ponty’s approach to psychopathology. 
1 Metaphysics 
It has been argued that Merleau-Ponty began his philosophical career as a phenomenologist, but 
by the end he had become a metaphysician—that is, a philosopher whose primary concern is 
with the nature of being, or reality. Merleau-Ponty certainly devoted himself to metaphysical 
questions in his later works, but he was concerned with metaphysics from the start. In this 
section, I outline Merleau-Ponty’s early phenomenological metaphysics, and show how he 
developed it with the aim of doing justice to psychopathological forms of human experience and 
existence. 
1.1 Husserl’s Transcendental Idealism 
Before jumping into Merleau-Ponty’s metaphysics, it will be helpful to outline the metaphysical 
position that he aims to overcome. Rather than criticizing a single philosopher, Merleau-Ponty 
criticizes a philosophical position called transcendental idealism. This metaphysical stance 
originated in Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason ([1781] 1999), and had a major 
influence on the course of 19th- and 20th-century philosophy. While transcendental idealism takes 
various forms, we can focus on two elements that concern Merleau-Ponty specifically: First, it 
posits that the human subject constitutes or discloses a lived, orderly, and meaningful world—or 
makes the experiential world present—through some operation of the mind; second, it posits that 
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the structures of human subjectivity that constitute the world of experience are essential, 
unchanging, or innate mental structures—they are necessary conditions for the possibility of 
knowledge and experience. 
 Husserl, insofar as he aimed to uncover the essential structures of consciousness and the 
necessary conditions for the possibility of experience, espoused a metaphysics of transcendental 
idealism. In this respect, phenomenology was originally conceived as an eidetic science—a 
philosophical investigation into the eidos, or essence, of human experience and existence. This 
approach is best exemplified in Ideas I (Husserl [1913] 2014), the first major work in which 
Husserl established phenomenology as a transcendental project inspired by the Kantian tradition. 
In this early work, Husserl was not concerned with human contingency, variability, or 
particularity. Instead, he concerned himself with necessity, invariance, and universality.  
But soon his phenomenology became “genetic phenomenology,” a concrete investigation 
into the genesis—i.e., the origins and development—of human experience. This new 
phenomenology emphasized how our body and history shape how we experience and understand 
our environment. Developing phenomenology in this direction, Husserl explored physical 
disabilities, such as blindness and deafness, as well as cultural differences. He admits, for 
example, that some cultural groups have a cyclical—rather than linear—conception of time, and 
therefore experience the flow of time differently (Husserl [1935] 2008). But these studies 
introduced confusion into his philosophical project: How can we articulate the essential, 
invariant structure of experience if this structure differs across cultures, and for people with 
certain physical disabilities? This seems a contradiction. He resolved this concern in his final 
book, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (Husserl [1954] 
1970), by arguing that there are both essential, unchanging structures of experience, and 
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historically contingent structures. Necessary structures are “transcendental”; contingent 
structures are “empirical.” Furthermore—and this is the key point in resolving the 
contradiction—the empirical structures are founded upon the transcendental structures. That is to 
say, despite our differences, there are basic structures of experience that we all share. If, for 
example, you and I grew up in different linguistic communities, then I will perceive certain 
symbols etched on paper as meaningful words, but you will perceive them as meaningless 
symbols (if you perceive them as symbols at all). You, on the other hand, will experience other 
kinds of symbols as meaningful words, while I will experience them as just meaningless 
symbols. Yet, in spite of this difference, we both have the capacity to acquire written language, 
that is, to experience symbols etched on paper as conveying multifaceted and complex meanings. 
In other words, while the linguistic structure of our experience differs empirically—perhaps I 
understand English and you understand Mandarin—we both have the same transcendental 
conditions that allow us to acquire and employ written language. In the same spirit, we could 
resolve the apparent conflict between different cultures’ experiences of the passage of time by 
suggesting that empirically different conceptions (e.g., of time as linear or as circular), are 
founded upon, or made possible by, the same transcendental structure of temporality.  
 This two-level approach seems to accommodate human difference, thereby allowing 
phenomenologists to investigate diverse forms of human life. But Husserl was not convinced that 
his solution could accommodate more profound changes in experience, such as the experience of 
the infant, or of the person with a severe mental disorder (Husserl [1954] 1970, 187–88). These 
conditions might involve alterations of the most fundamental structures of experience. The 
infant, for example, lacks the capacity for written language—not because she has not learned 
one, but because she currently lacks the cognitive conditions for learning a written language in 
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the first place (Heinämaa 2014). If these alterations occur not only in the course of normal 
development, but also in psychopathological conditions in adulthood, then this might undermine 
Husserl’s claim that there are universal structures of experience shared by all human beings. 
1.2 Merleau-Ponty’s Metaphysics 
Husserl does not resolve this tension in his own work, but he sets it out as a problem for future 
phenomenologists. Luckily, his challenge was not ignored. Merleau-Ponty was one of the first 
philosophers to acquaint himself with Husserl’s late work and unpublished manuscripts, and took 
up Husserl’s above-mentioned challenge. He resolved to develop a new metaphysics that 
accommodated the diversity of human life, including psychopathology. 
 In Merleau-Ponty’s most famous work, Phenomenology of Perception ([1945] 2012), he 
introduces the case of Johann Schneider, a German World War I veteran who suffered a brain 
injury and whose condition was studied extensively by the psychologist Adhemar Gelb and the 
neurologist Kurt Goldstein. Schneider’s condition involves a fundamental disturbance in his 
bodily motility. Schneider is unable to perform “abstract” movements with his eyes closed—that 
is, movements that take place in an imagined or merely possible situation, rather than the actual, 
concrete situation. Such actions might include anything from moving a limb up and down upon 
command to performing in a theatrical production to illustrating how objects move in an 
objective coordinate system. Yet, in spite of Schneider’s inability to perform these movements, 
he can easily perform “concrete” movements—that is, movements that take place within his 
actual, or concrete, situation. While Schneider cannot move his arm up and down upon 
command, he can easily reach into his back pocket, remove his handkerchief, and blow his nose 
(Merleau-Ponty [1945] 2012, 105–12). 
 8 
 Merleau-Ponty argues that Schneider’s behavior reveals a fundamental disturbance in 
how he experiences space. And this disturbance is the product of Schneider having lost the 
function of “projection,” or of “conjuring up” meaningful situations ([1945] 2012, 115). 
Maintaining his habitual world of everyday engagements, he nevertheless cannot project other 
kinds of space, such as the objective space of a coordinate system, or the imagined space 
required for playing or acting. Schneider’s loss of the capacity for “projection” reveals two ways 
that human beings engage with a meaningful world. As Merleau-Ponty argues, in much of our 
everyday life, we function within the concrete situation of our environment. When I enter the 
classroom, there is already a network of meaningful relations among myself, my students, the 
tables and chairs, and the whiteboard. I do not need to actively create this situation. It simply 
presents itself to me. But we also find occasion to play and act, to speculate, to theorize. And 
when we perform these activities, we do so within a situation that we ourselves project, or 
conjure up. Moreover, we do not convince ourselves that this new situation is real. Rather, we 
move within this situation precisely as fictional, or as imaginary: when I perform Shakespeare’s 
Hamlet, I do not take myself to be the real Hamlet; I experience my performance as a 
performance. Likewise, if my friend and I watched The Changing of the Guard in London and I 
imitate the guard’s march, I do not take myself to be the guard; we both experience my behavior 
precisely as an act of imitation, or play, that only makes sense within the particular imaginative 
context that we have projected for ourselves. Schneider, and those with similar conditions, 
cannot have this kind of experience. They can no longer project new situations around 
themselves. As Merleau-Ponty says, “The world no longer exists for these patients except as a 
ready-made or fixed world, whereas the normal person’s projects polarize the world, causing a 
thousand signs to appear there” ([1945] 2012, 115). Schneider cannot even have political or 
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religious opinions—these domains do not reside in his concrete situation, and he cannot produce 
them himself. 
 Schneider’s condition and Merleau-Ponty’s analysis have received considerable attention 
(Dreyfus 2007; Matherne 2014; Romdenh-Romluc 2007). But much of this literature ignores 
how Merleau-Ponty used this case study as a catalyst and justification for his metaphysical 
project. Merleau-Ponty suggests that the transcendental idealist—including the Husserlian 
phenomenologist—could not account for Schneider’s condition by appealing to the loss of 
projection. This is because for the transcendental idealist, “[o]ne thing alone is comprehensible, 
namely, the pure essence of consciousness” (Merleau-Ponty [1945] 2012, 127). The 
transcendental idealist posits an essential, invariant structure of consciousness, and therefore 
cannot appeal to changes in this structure when trying to make sense of the condition. In light of 
this metaphysical commitment, he is left with two equally implausible options when presented 
with the mentally ill person: this person either fails to count as an experiencing subject, or he is 
deceiving himself—“Behind his delusions, obsessions, and lies, the madman knows that he is 
delirious, that he makes himself obsessive, that he lies, and ultimately that he is not mad, he just 
thinks he is” (Merleau-Ponty [1945] 2012, 127). A metaphysics of transcendental idealism leaves 
no room for severe psychopathology because it posits in advance a universal structure of 
consciousness manifested by all human beings; one either manifests this universal structure, or 
one is not an experiencing subject at all. 
 In light of this shortcoming, Merleau-Ponty requires a new metaphysics that does justice 
to the possibility and diversity of mental illness (Fernandez 2015). This project of devising a 
post-transcendental metaphysics occupied Merleau-Ponty up to his final, unfinished work, The 
Visible and the Invisible ([1964] 1968). However, he set up the problem and provided an initial 
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sketch of his metaphysical solution in Phenomenology of Perception. He set himself the task of 
finding “the means of linking the origin and the essence of the disorder,” or of establishing “a 
concrete essence or a structure of the illness that expresses both its generality and its 
particularity” ([1945] 2012, 127). In other words, rather than seek the essence of consciousness 
as such, he seeks the general structure of each kind of consciousness, while also keeping sight of 
those features that are distinctive of each particular case. In so doing, he must acknowledge the 
generality of the illness (i.e., those features shared by everyone with this kind of condition), and 
the particularity of the illness (i.e., those features that are distinctive of the individual’s 
condition). For example, in a study of schizophrenia, the Merleau-Pontyan phenomenologist 
should articulate general features of schizophrenia (e.g., the general structure of hallucinations), 
while also attending to its distinctive manifestation in the subject in question (e.g., the particular 
objects that this subject hallucinates). 
To develop this new phenomenological metaphysics, Merleau-Ponty aims to establish “a 
relationship that would be neither the reduction of the form to the content, nor the subsumption 
of the content under an autonomous form” ([1945] 2012, 128). In other words, we cannot appeal 
to an autonomous, transcendental structure of experience that determines the content of 
experience in advance. This wouldn’t leave any room for contingent experiences, or the 
accidents of human life, to alter the fundamental structure of experience—as they do in some 
cases of psychopathology. According to Merleau-Ponty, we can only resolve this problem if we 
admit an alternative metaphysical relation between the form and content of experience, one in 
which “[f]orm absorbs content to the point that content ultimately appears as a mere mode of 
form” ([1945] 2012, 128). He suggests, initially, that this will be a dialectical relationship 
between form and matter in which the two sides intertwine and mutually shape each other. But 
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this, he admits, is a poor characterization. It assumes that form and content are two independent 
phenomena that might come into contact. But, in actuality, each is an abstraction from the real 
phenomenon of “human existence,” which he redefines as “the perpetual taking up of fact and 
chance by a reason that neither exists in advance of this taking up, nor without it” ([1945] 2012, 
129). 
 Merleau-Ponty’s approach seems promising, but it’s difficult to decipher—in part 
because he embraces contradictory formulations and paradoxical language. We can clarify his 
approach by drawing a parallel with Gestalt psychology, which had a major influence on his 
thinking. The Gestalt psychologists argued that our experience is self-organizing. I do not 
impose a form on the contents of my experience. Rather, the contents of experience form 
themselves into a self-organized, meaningful whole. It is always this whole that I am presented 
with, which is not simply a sum of distinct parts. Merleau-Ponty, inspired by this psychological 
insight, transformed it into a metaphysical insight about human existence itself. Human existence 
does not have some necessary form that is simply filled in by contingent content. Rather, what 
we call the “form” or “structure” of human existence is a description of the holistic organization 
that my experience and existence assume. Because this form is not independent or autonomous, 
it can be fundamentally reshaped by the content of life-experiences. Human existence is always 
shaped by its natural and cultural circumstances. This is not to say that the subject is passively 
constituted by her environment. She also constitutes the sense and meaning of her environment 
in turn. Merleau-Ponty’s point is to highlight that there is no autonomous, unchanging form of 
human existence that underlies our particularities and differences. Insofar as we are subject to the 
circumstances of life, we are radically contingent beings.iii 
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 In this formulation of human existence we find the metaphysical possibility of mental 
illness, or of the disordered subject. According to Merleau-Ponty, it is because our subjectivity is 
embedded in a material body and a concrete environment that we can become ill in the first 
place. 
1.3 Metaphysics: Contemporary Applications 
Of course, our goal is not simply to understand Merleau-Ponty’s new metaphysics—our goal is 
to apply it. But how does one “apply” a metaphysics? Metaphysics seems the most abstract of 
philosophical inquiries, concerned with the nature of reality, not the practical study of mental 
disorders. Yet, the metaphysical system that we subscribe to always comes with a host of 
assumptions about our subject matter: What we choose to study, how we approach our objects of 
investigation, and how we interpret our findings are determined by our metaphysical 
presuppositions. As Merleau-Ponty points out, if a psychologist subscribes to transcendental 
idealism then he cannot take the possibility of mental disorder seriously. Rather than explain it, 
he explains it away; it has no place within his metaphysical system. 
 A phenomenologist who takes up Merleau-Ponty’s metaphysics will interpret her subject 
matter differently; she will open herself to possibilities that might be neglected by a more 
traditional phenomenological metaphysics because she will not presume the necessity or 
invariance of any particular structure of subjectivity. We already found an example of this in 
Merleau-Ponty’s study of Schneider, where he argues that Schneider’s condition is best 
understood not as the projection of a distressing situation (as we find in neuroses), but as the loss 
of the capacity to project such a situation in the first place. This possibility, he suggests, is not 
open to the transcendental idealist because it conflicts with whatone might take to be the pure 
essence of consciousness. It would have to be dismissed as a metaphysical impossibility. The 
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transcendental idealist, confining himself to those accounts that make sense within his 
metaphysical framework, is left with a much smaller range of possible alterations to appeal to. 
 How does this model play out in contemporary phenomenological psychopathology? 
Many contemporary phenomenologists still subscribe to some form of transcendental idealism, 
insofar as they take on some of the metaphysical commitments of Husserl or early Heidegger. 
Even in contemporary studies of psychopathology, phenomenology is often characterized as the 
study of essential structures of consciousness, which seems to draw an in-principle distinction 
between those structures of consciousness that can change, and those that cannot. 
 We can illustrate how these metaphysical presuppositions play out in two examples: 
affectivity in major depressive disorder (MDD) and selfhood in schizophrenia. 
Phenomenologists often rely on first-person reports, whether from qualitative studies, memoirs, 
or face-to-face conversations. The phenomenologist examines these first-person reports, and then 
articulates how the structures of experience must have altered such that the world would be 
experienced in the way the subject describes it. 
In the case of MDD, many people report changes in their moods and emotions. As a 
result, phenomenologists (and psychiatrists) often characterize depression as a distinctive mood, 
or way of being affectively attuned to the world—e.g., profound sadness, grief, guilt, or despair. 
Many of these phenomenologists also work within an early Heideggerian framework, which, like 
the Husserlian framework, assumes a level of essential, invariant structures of human experience. 
Heidegger, for instance, argues that affective attunement is essential to human existence, and that 
human beings are therefore always attuned to their world through some mood or other; it is 
impossible to be without a mood (Heidegger [1927] 1962, 172–79). However, many people 
describe their depression as a loss of moods and emotions in general, rather than as a certain 
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kind of mood, or even as a loss of particular moods, such as happiness or joy (Fernandez 2014). 
In his memoir, The Noonday Demon, Andrew Solomon describes this experience: 
The first thing that goes is happiness. You cannot gain pleasure from anything. That’s 
famously the cardinal symptom of major depression. But soon other emotions follow 
happiness into oblivion: sadness as you know it, the sadness that seemed to have led you 
here; your sense of humor; your belief in and capacity for love. Your mind is leached 
until you seem dim-witted even to yourself […] You lose the ability to trust anyone, to be 
touched, to grieve. Eventually, you are simply absent from yourself. (Solomon 2001, 19) 
 
Reports like this—where one cannot feel sadness, cannot even grieve—pervade the literature on 
depression. Yet, in both the phenomenological and the psychiatric literature, these reports are 
often not explained; they are explained away. The reported loss of feeling is redescribed as a 
particular kind of feeling (e.g., a feeling of not feeling). At least in the phenomenologist’s case, 
this tendency to redescribe a loss of feeling as a kind of feeling falls in line with Husserl’s and 
Heidegger’s metaphysical presuppositions. There are certain structures of experience that we 
presume to be essential. If we know in advance that they cannot be lost, then we need not 
consider such a possibility. 
 A similar debate plays out in the phenomenological literature on selfhood in 
schizophrenia and other disorders. Husserlian phenomenologists are generally committed to the 
claim that some sense of selfhood, at least in the minimal sense of “for-me-ness,” always 
accompanies experience. This aspect of minimal selfhood is part of the essence of experience; it 
would be impossible to have an experience without it. But, as Dan Zahavi points out, some 
philosophers argue that psychopathology provides an objection to this account (Zahavi 
Forthcoming). They argue that some experiences, such as thought-insertion and severe 
depersonalization—both symptoms of schizophrenia—are characterized by an experience 
without a basic sense of for-me-ness, or sense of mineness. Zahavi argues, in contrast, that if we 
adequately clarify our various notions of selfhood, we will find that even in these 
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psychopathological cases a sense of for-me-ness is retained, necessarily entailing that some sense 
of self and self-awareness remains intact. 
 There is, however, an important point to consider in Zahavi’s approach. While he might 
begin his investigations within a Husserlian framework, he remains open to the possibility of 
deep contingencies and alterations in the structure of experience. He does not simply assume that 
we retain a minimal sense of self even in cases of thought-insertion and severe depersonalization. 
He carefully considers the evidence and provides arguments for his position. This, in the end, is 
not so different from Merleau-Ponty’s approach to the study of psychopathology. While 
Merleau-Ponty would likely admit more contingency in the structure of experience than would a 
Husserlian phenomenologist, he sometimes makes essentialist claims about experience, and 
seems willing to defend them—e.g., that the perception of a figure is possible only if the figure is 
presented upon a background.iv 
By providing these examples, I am not arguing that it is necessarily incorrect to 
characterize the affective dimension of depression as a kind of mood, or to characterize 
experiences of thought-insertion and severe depersonalization as retaining a basic sense of 
selfhood. Rather, I want to illustrate how our metaphysical commitments predetermine how we 
interpret our evidence—what we dismiss, what we take seriously, what we feel justified in 
redescribing, and so on. This holds for evidence beyond self-reports, but contemporary 
phenomenological psychopathologists often rely on self-reports as a major source of evidence, so 
it is worthwhile to think about how we engage—and how we should engage—with such 
evidence. 
 Merleau-Ponty’s metaphysical commitments—in contrast with Husserl’s and the early 
Heidegger’s—allow more leeway in how we interpret our case studies. And Merleau-Ponty 
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developed this metaphysical stance precisely because he was unsatisfied with classical 
phenomenology’s inability to do justice to the phenomena. For Merleau-Ponty, we always need 
some metaphysical system to ground and guide our investigations. But this metaphysical system 
is only as good as the results it produces. As soon as it forces us to make absurd claims, to 
dismiss evidence, or to devise unjustified interpretations of the phenomena, it is the metaphysical 
system—and not the phenomenon itself—that we must dispense with. 
2 Method 
Despite differences among phenomenologists concerning the right metaphysical foundations for 
understanding human existence, there are broad methodological commitments that all 
phenomenologists share. One of these is the methodological commitment to critically evaluating 
and suspending our presuppositions and prejudices. If we do not critically evaluate our 
presuppositions, then we risk describing our phenomenon of investigation not as it is, but as we 
already believe it to be. Rather than accurately describing what Husserl calls “the matters 
themselves,” we might simply reiterate the current cultural or scientific conception of our subject 
matter. But while all phenomenologists agree that we should maintain a critical attitude toward 
our prejudices, they do not agree on how we should evaluate and suspend these prejudices. They 
employ different methods of evaluation and suspension, and they express varying degrees of 
optimism about how successful these methods can be.v 
2.1 Husserl’s Reduction 
In Husserl’s case, the central element of his method is the phenomenological reduction. 
Depending on how we interpret it, there are either multiple reductions—the transcendental, the 
eidetic, and so on—or multiple stages of the reduction. Which interpretation we adopt here is not 
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especially important, but our focus will be on the epoché, which we might characterize as either 
the first reduction, or the first stage of the reduction, depending on the interpretation we employ. 
Husserl borrowed the term “epoché” from the Greek skeptics, who argued that we should 
suspend judgment on any matter until we have considered all of the evidence. But for Husserl, 
the epoché isn’t so much a suspension of explicit judgments as it is a suspension of our tacit 
beliefs about the world and our experience of it. Moreover, Husserl’s epoché is first and 
foremost a change in attitude—a shift from the natural attitude to the phenomenological attitude. 
The natural attitude is the attitude of everyday life in which we take our experience of the world 
for granted; we do not reflect on how the world is presented to us through experience. This 
everyday attitude is problematic for the phenomenologist because she aims to articulate how we 
experience the world, and how our subjectivity plays a role in its presentation. She therefore 
shifts herself into a phenomenological attitude, focusing on how we experience, rather than what 
we experience. As Robert Sokolowski puts it, in the epoché “[w]e look at what we normally look 
through” (Sokolowski 2000, 50). 
This shift into the phenomenological attitude requires that we suspend, or bracket, our 
host of presuppositions and prejudices about the world. For example, in order to attend to how an 
object of experience is presented to me—say, my coffee mug—I have to suspend my beliefs that 
the mug is already there, existing independent of me, taking up physical space, available to 
others, and so on. As a phenomenologist, I ask how the coffee mug presents itself to me as 
existing independent of me, as taking up physical space, as available to others, and so on. When 
producing these descriptions I cannot presume, for instance, that the world is already populated 
by physical objects and that my perceptual capacities merely present me with appearances of 
these physical objects. Even if this were an accurate natural-scientific account of perception, it is 
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not the kind of account the phenomenologist is after. It fails to describe how these objects are 
presented to me in the first place. 
 While Husserl remained committed to the importance of the epoché, his method evolved 
over his philosophical career. When his interest shifted from the necessary and universal 
structures of experience to the contingent and culturally relative, he developed new methods to 
accommodate his new subject matter. In his studies of the cultural constitution of experience, 
Husserl realized that our cultural prejudices shape our experience to such a profound degree that 
we cannot simply suspend these prejudices in one fell swoop. They are ingrained in us, shaping 
not just our beliefs about what we experience, but even how we experience. Therefore, when we 
try to enter the phenomenological attitude via the epoché, we often retain prejudices that we 
didn’t even know we had. 
 This poses a problem for the phenomenologist, who wants to return to “the matters 
themselves.” If our presuppositions about our subject matter are so ingrained that we cannot 
bracket them through the epoché—i.e., through a shift in attitude—then how can we continue to 
do phenomenology? If we are incapable of extricating ourselves from our own prejudices, then 
we are condemned to describe what we already believe to be the case, and nothing more. In light 
of this problem, Husserl takes a methodological turn, although his goal remains the same. Rather 
than bracket his presuppositions through a change in attitude, he brackets his prejudices by 
actively seeking them out and analyzing them. Only through this process can he loosen his 
presuppositions to such a degree that he might attend to the matters themselves. 
 Some scholars argue that Husserl’s late works usher in a different kind of epoché, what 
David Carr calls the “historical reduction” (2009). This new epoché aims at the same ends—the 
loosening and suspending of prejudices—but employs the means of historical inquiry. If we want 
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to understand our current prejudices and how they shape our experience, we need to discover the 
origins of these prejudices and find where they sedimented into our cultural lifeworld—i.e., the 
meaningful world of everyday life. To take one example, consider Husserl’s historical inquiry 
into Galileo’s “mathematization of nature” (Husserl [1954] 1970). He argues that Galileo’s 
major contribution to scientific thought was not his discovery of basic principles of the physical 
universe, but his reconceptualization of nature as objective. He claims that prior to this 
reconceptualization, we experienced the natural world as shared, as available to others in the way 
it is available to us. But we did not experience it as objective, in the sense of some independent 
reality existing behind the merely subjective appearances presented in our experience. It was 
Galileo’s novel conception of nature, he argues, that sedimented into our lifeworld—at least the 
European lifeworld—and became the normal way of experiencing our environment. According 
to Husserl, Galileo initiated a worldview in which we discount our everyday experiences in favor 
of the insights of a particular cultural practice—the practice of natural science. 
While many celebrate this worldview, Husserl laments the fact that this Galilean insight 
covered over the richness of everyday experience. It is this experience that phenomenologists 
aim to describe, but that a natural-scientific worldview ignores. In order to get back to this 
experience, he argues, we must discover the prejudices that have reshaped our experience, and 
only then can we suspend them and return to “the matters themselves.” It is this new method, I 
argue, that inspires Merleau-Ponty’s approach to psychopathological experience and subjectivity. 
2.2 Merleau-Ponty’s Incomplete Reduction 
 Merleau-Ponty famously said, “The most important lesson about the reduction is the 
impossibility of the complete reduction” ([1945] 2012, lxxvii). This is not a dismissal of 
Husserl’s reduction. Merleau-Ponty does not believe the reduction is impossible, only that its 
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completion is impossible. And this falls in line with Husserl’s late approach, which requires that 
we remain open to the possibility of being misled by presuppositions and prejudices that we 
didn’t know we had.vi This is because we cannot fully extract ourselves from our embodied, 
historical context: 
This is why Husserl always wonders anew about the possibility of the reduction. If we 
were absolute spirit, the reduction would not be problematic. But since, on the contrary, 
we are in and toward the world, and since even our reflections take place in the temporal 
flow that they are attempting to capture… there is no thought that encompasses all of our 
thought. Or again, as the unpublished materials say, the philosopher is a perpetual 
beginner. This means that he accepts nothing as established from what men or scientists 
believe they know. (Merleau-Ponty [1945] 2012, lxxvii–lxxviii) 
 
We must subject both our everyday and scientific beliefs to critical scrutiny. And, whenever we 
are able, we must hold these beliefs in abeyance until we consider all of the available evidence 
and properly attend to our phenomenon of investigation. 
 But what does this have to do with psychopathology? When Husserl developed his 
historical epoché, he was concerned with how geometry and post-Galilean physics altered the 
lifeworld of scientists, as well as the lifeworld of everyday people. He was interested in how 
scientific advancements prompted us to reconceive the natural world as objective and, as a result, 
doubt our own experiences insofar as we conceive of them as subjective. Merleau-Ponty carries 
on this tradition, but with an eye toward the prejudices of the contemporary cognitive sciences, 
including psychology, psychiatry, and neuroscience.  
 We find one of the best examples of this approach in Merleau-Ponty’s introduction to 
Phenomenology of Perception, entitled, “Classical Prejudices and the Return to Phenomena.” 
Here, he undermines the prejudices and presuppositions that we might have about our subject 
matter—in this case, perception—in order to get at the “phenomena,” or what Husserl would call 
“the matters themselves.” But Merleau-Ponty does not ask us to slip into a phenomenological 
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attitude in which our “classical prejudices” fall away, leaving us with the untainted phenomena. 
Rather, he undermines prejudice by confronting it head on. He carefully analyzes standard 
concepts—including “sensation, “association,” “memory,” “attention,” and “judgment”—to 
show how our typical understanding of these concepts misleads us, causing us to misconstrue the 
nature of perception. In his study of “sensation,” for example, he shows that the three competing 
theories—sensation as (1) impression, (2) quality, and (3) immediate consequence of a 
stimulation—actually share a problematic presupposition. They presume that perception is built 
up of little bits of sense data that the subject conglomerates into a holistic experience (even if 
they disagree on the nature of this sense data and how the subject conglomerates them). The 
trouble with these views is that they explain the act of perceiving by appealing to objects of 
perception; they neglect the how in favor of the what. In short, they beg the question—they do 
not tell us how we experience objects as objects because they presume the existence of 
experiential objects (i.e., bits of sense data) in their explanations. As Merleau-Ponty says, “[w]e 
thought we knew what sensing, seeing, and hearing are, but now these words pose problems. We 
are led back to the very experiences that these words designate in order to define them anew” 
([1945] 2012, 10). What Merleau-Ponty provides us with in his introduction is not a new theory 
of perception, but a Socratic inquiry that makes manifest just how little we know about 
perception. Only by engaging in this negative inquiry, and discovering what we do not know, can 
we put ourselves in a position to develop a new and better theory of perception. This process, of 
course, can never be completed. There will always be more presuppositions and prejudices that 
we have missed. And we are therefore left with Merleau-Ponty’s incomplete reduction. 
2.3 Method: Contemporary Applications 
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 The application of method—unlike the application of metaphysics—is fairly 
straightforward: in order to apply a Merleau-Pontyan reduction to the domain of 
psychopathology, we should critically evaluate the basic concepts and presuppositions that 
ground this field of inquiry. If we fail to do this, we risk obscuring the psychopathological 
phenomena by describing what we already believe to be the case. 
 To illustrate this, we can consider examples of depression and bipoloar disorder. As 
Giovanni Stanghellini (2004) points out, recent editions of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders (DSM) and the International Classification of Diseases (ICD) insufficiently 
describe mental disorders and fail to clearly delineate their boundaries. Consider one of the 
central diagnostic criteria for MDD: depressed mood. Is a depressed mood a kind of mood, or a 
loss of feeling? Is it qualitatively different from a normal, healthy mood, or is it simply a matter 
of degree? Is it a pathological form of sadness, or is it different from sadness? None of these 
questions are answered—or even addressed—by contemporary diagnostic classifications. This is 
not because the answers are exceedingly difficult to come by, but because it is presumed that we 
all know what we mean by “depressed mood.” We do not even realize it is a question that needs 
asking. But as phenomenologists have shown, when it comes to our own experience we know 
considerably less than we think. 
 A similar problem plays out in the psychiatric literature on bipolar disorder. The term 
“bipolar” suggests that the condition not only includes two distinct states—depression and 
mania—but that these states are polar opposites. This feature of the condition is contained in its 
label, and the term therefore predisposes us to think about the condition as a movement between 
these two poles. But if we look to the history of the concept of bipolar disorder, we find that the 
bipolar model—which succeeded the concepts of “manic-depressive insanity” and “manic-
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depressive reaction”—was just one of three competing models. Other researchers put forward the 
“triangular model” and the “continuum model.” On the triangular model, there are three distinct 
states—depression, mania, and euthymia (i.e., a healthy, positive mood)—that are related like 
points on a triangle. This means that one can move from one state to any other without passing 
through the third state. One advantage of this model is that is allows us to explain mixed states—
i.e., states in which symptoms of depression and mania manifest simultaneously—as a shift from 
depression to mania, or from mania to depression, that does not pass through euthymia. On the 
continuum model, the two poles are actually euthymia and mania, with depression in the middle. 
In this case, depression and mania are not conceived of as opposites, and mixed states are 
unsurprising because any move between euthymia and mania must pass through a state of 
depression. Importantly, there does not seem to be much evidence that supports the bipolar 
model over the other two models. For one reason or another the bipolar model caught on and is 
now the established label for this condition. In forgetting the history of this concept, it is all too 
easy to begin our investigations from the assumption that depression and mania are, in fact, polar 
opposites, and this can problematically predetermine how we describe the experiences of 
depression and mania (Fernandez 2016a). 
 Leaving aside the philosophical inquiry into “the matters themselves,” why should 
psychiatrists and those living with mental disorders be concerned about undefined or poorly 
defined diagnostic criteria? If psychiatrists already have a basic sense of what they mean by 
“depressed mood,” isn’t that enough for clinical practice? One problem is that there is no reason 
to think that psychiatrists agree on their definitions of diagnostic criteria. If this is the case, then 
they certainly do not agree on how and when to apply these criteria. Perhaps one psychiatrist 
believes that depressed mood is like severe sadness, another thinks it is a deep sense of guilt, and 
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yet another thinks it is a loss of feeling. These psychiatrists will hardly be able to agree on who 
should be diagnosed with MDD, which kinds of interventions should be made for which 
individuals, and when to deem someone cured, or healthy. And this is only in the domain of 
clinical practice. If we delve into psychiatric research we will find a host of new problems, such 
as disagreements in selecting who should be included in a study, or in how to assess the efficacy 
of an intervention. 
 But this risks confusing two important issues. Some of these problems might be 
overcome by stipulating clear definitions of each diagnostic criterion, and therefore clear 
definitions of each category of disorder. This would at least produce agreement among 
psychiatrists—they will diagnose the same patients in the same way, establishing what 
psychiatrists call “reliability.” However, phenomenologists should not be satisfied with clearly 
stipulated definitions. They should strive for definitions that get at the heart of the matter, clearly 
articulating the nature and boundaries of the condition in question. They should want their 
definitions and descriptions of disorders to be “valid.”vii When it comes to “depressed mood” or 
“bipolar disorder,” the phenomenologist should not want the psychiatric community to simply 
put forward a definition. Rather, we should carefully attend to the experience that we are trying 
to point to with each criterion, discover whether it is in fact a unitary phenomenon (or perhaps 
diverse phenomena clumped under a common label), and articulate its essential features. Only by 
proceeding in this fashion can we ever hope to fully understand the psychopathological condition 
in question. 
 To enact Merleau-Ponty’s reduction, or epoché, phenomenologists need to attend to the 
concepts used in contemporary psychiatric research and practice, as well as in everyday 
discourse, and unearth what we are trying to refer to with these terms. In many cases, we might 
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discover that those who employ the term do not have a good sense of its meaning or its referent. 
Such an inquiry does not reveal the nature of the phenomenon in question, but it at least reveals 
how little we know, and thereby puts us in a better position to explore and articulate our 
phenomenon of interest. Only after interrogating our basic concepts will we be in a position to 
bracket out our presuppositions, and proceed in our phenomenological investigations of the 
psychopathological condition itself.viii 
3. Conclusion 
The application of phenomenology to the study of mental disorders is by no means new, having 
been established at least as early as Jaspers’ General Psychopathology (Jaspers [1913] 1997). It 
is, however, undergoing resurgence today, especially in the philosophical and psychiatric 
literature on schizophrenia, depression, and various neurological disorders. But much of this 
work, both historical and contemporary, applies classical phenomenological concepts—such as 
selfhood, affectivity, and temporality—without critically engaging the phenomenon of mental 
disorder itself. There is a general assumption that insofar as phenomenology inquires into human 
experience, it is equipped to investigate any human experience. As I have shown, however, the 
traditional Husserlian approach is not well equipped for the study of dramatic shifts from normal 
to pathological experience. Husserl’s metaphysics presumes an essential structure of experience 
that is not susceptible to alteration. And his early version of the epoché overestimates our ability 
to suspend our presuppositions and prejudices (although his later method moves in the right 
direction). Merleau-Ponty, by contrast, offers a phenomenological approach that takes 
psychopathology seriously. He devises a new metaphysics that allows for contingency in the 
most fundamental structures of experience and existence. And his method acknowledges our 
human limitations, such as our inability to fully extricate ourselves from long-held beliefs. He 
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therefore recommends critical engagement with contemporary scientific concepts; only by 
discovering their shortcomings can we put them out of play and return to the phenomenon anew. 
Through his commitment to accommodating the contingencies of human life, Merleau-Ponty—
more than any other phenomenologist—provides the metaphysical and methodological 
foundations for the contemporary study of psychopathology. 
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i This contrast between Sartre and Merleau-Ponty is a matter of emphasis, rather than a strict 
divide between their interests and concerns. Moreover, it relies on a caricature of Sartre’s 
thought—albeit one that Merleau-Ponty himself perpetuated in some of his work. For a careful 
account of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty’s debate over the nature of freedom—and Beauvoir’s 
mediation—see Wilkerson (2010). 
ii There are, of course, some exceptions. Binswanger and Boss, for instance, seriously considered 
the relation between their phenomenological approaches and biomedical models of 
psychopathology. Merleau-Ponty even drew on certain elements of Binswanger’s metaphysics, 
but I cannot go into this here. 
iii There are a host of problems that arise from Merleau-Ponty’s radical contingency, but I cannot 
address them here. Perhaps the most important is the difficulty of reconciling radical contingency 
with Husserl’s critiques of psychologism and historicism—i.e., the philosophical claim that 
mathematics and logic are relative to the structure of the human mind, or two particular cultural 
configurations, and are therefore only true for us. Husserl’s transcendental ego was meant to 
address this problem by establishing essential structures of experience. But Merleau-Ponty’s 
embrace of the radically contingent subject seems to dispense with this solution to psychologism. 
For an account of how Merleau-Ponty reconciles his account of human subjectivity with the 
possibility of mathematical truths, see Hass and Hass (2000).  
iv Some interpreters grant considerably more weight to Merleau-Ponty’s apparently essentialist 
claims, and have used these claims to argue that Merleau-Ponty is himself a transcendental 
philosopher. For an example of this position, see Sebastian Gardner (2015). 
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v For accounts of the various roles that prejudices play in phenomenological research, see 
Fernandez (2016a, 2016b). 
vi This general stance seems to be shared by most post-Husserlian phenomenologists, including 
the hermeneutic phenomenologists, such as Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer, and the 
existential phenomenologists. 
vii The psychiatric concept of “validity” is notoriously difficult to define, and there is not a 
currently agreed upon definition (see Tabb 2015). 
viii In this respect, the above characterization of applied metaphysics might be interpreted as one 
segment of applied method. That is, insofar as phenomenologists are methodologically 
committed to critically evaluating and suspending their full range of presuppositions and 
prejudices, they are necessarily committed to critically evaluating and suspending their 
metaphysical prejudices (e.g., the prejudices of transcendental idealism). Nevertheless, because 
of the all-encompassing nature of metaphysical presuppositions, I find it helpful to discuss these 
presuppositions independently.  
